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Catfish, Shrimp, and the WTO:
Vietnam Loses Its Innocence
Do Thanh Cong*

ABSTRACT

This Article explores the advantages that WTO membership
brings to Vietnam in connection with antidumping disputes. In
particular,this Article examines the trade relationship between
Vietnam and the United States, including disputes over catfish
and shrimp, prior to Vietnam's accession to the WTO. The
Article concludes that Vietnam's WTO membership and
experience with catfish and shrimp will serve exporters well
when new trade disputes arise. Vietnamese exporters will better
understand their options and will be better equipped to defend
themselves in antidumping disputes.
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In 2007, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam became a member of
the World Trade Organization (WTO),' an event that brought both
opportunities and challenges. As a WTO member, Vietnam must
ensure that its legal system is consistent with the organization's
regulations, 2 and other WTO members may challenge Vietnam if its
laws and policies are inconsistent with their own rights and
obligations under WTO Agreements.3 Vietnam must treat goods and
services from other WTO members equally and no less favorably than
Vietnamese goods and services; in return, Vietnam is entitled to
require other WTO members to accord the same treatment to
Vietnamese goods and services. 4

1.
Member Information: Viet Nam and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/countriese /vietnam e.htm (last visited Oct. 13,
2010).

2.
See Understanding the WTO: The Organization, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis e/tif elorg3_e.htm (last visited Oct. 13,
2010) (emphasizing the commitment to following specific rules and regulations upon
accepting WTO membership).
3.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
4.
These are the basic requirements of most favored nation treatment and
national treatment under the WTO regulations. See General Agreement on Trade in
Services arts. II, XVII, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 (demanding transparency from
member nations regarding any measures the nation takes that may affect its
involvement, and requiring all members to treat other members no less favorably than
other members treat their own services and suppliers); see generally General
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In 2000, Vietnam and the United States signed a Bilateral Trade
Agreement (BTA).5 As a result, the export of Vietnamese aquaculture
products to the United States increased significantly, and some of
these products began to compete with American aquaculture
products, most notably catfish and shrimp. Consequently, the Catfish
Farmers Association of America (in 2001) and the Southern Shrimp
Alliance (in 2004) filed petitions against Vietnamese exporters. 6
These petitions alleged that Vietnamese catfish and shrimp products
were being dumped in the U.S. market.7 After investigating the
allegations, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) and the U.S.
International Trade Commission (ITC) found that dumping had
occurred, causing injury to American catfish and shrimp farmers. 8
The DOC imposed heavy antidumping duties on Vietnamese catfish
and shrimp companies. 9
American antidumping laws and the processing of the
antidumping cases by the DOC and ITC were widely criticized.
However, at that time, Vietnam was not yet a member of the WTO.
Therefore, Vietnam could not challenge the antidumping decision
under WTO regulations. This is no longer the case, however, because
Vietnam has joined the WTO. On February 2, 2010, upon request of
the Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers
(VASEP), the Vietnamese government sent a request to the
commercial representative of the United States at the WTO and
initiated a WTO adjudication procedure with respect to the U.S.
antidumping tariffs on Vietnamese frozen shrimp.' 0
This Article argues that WTO membership advantages Vietnam
in antidumping disputes. Part I provides background on dumping.
Part II summarizes BTA regulations that relate to dumping and
analyzes the catfish cases and the shrimp cases. Part III studies the
challenges to Vietnamese exporters and producers in antidumping

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 arts. 1, 111, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
GATT 1994] (enumerating the terms of the agreement and clarifying which provisions
it includes).
5.
Chronology of Key Ev ents in U.S.-Viet. Relations, U.S. VIETNAM TRADE
COUNCIL, http://www.usvtc.org/us-vietnam/Chronology/Chronology/20of%20US-VN%/
20Relations%2022May08.pdf (last modified May 22, 2008).
See infra Part III.
6.
7.
See infra Part III.
8.
See infra Part III.
9.
See infra Part III.
10.
Ngoc Hung, Vietnant May Beat U.S. on Anti-Dumping Duty Case: VASEP,
SAIGON TIMES, Feb. 9, 2010, http://english.thesaigontimes.vn/Home/business/vietnameconomy/8769/; De xuat hien My ra WTO, thu truong Bo Cong Thuong Le Danh Vinh:
"Chung toi da can nhac rat ky" [Proposition to Start ProceedingsAgainst the U.S. at the
WTO, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Le Danh Vinh: "We have
thought carefully'], TUol TRE ONLINE (June 2, 2010), http://www.tuoitre.com.vn/
Tianyon/Index.aspx?ArticlelD=362850&ChannellD =11.
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disputes. Part IV and Part V analyze WTO antidumping regulations
and discuss which parts of WTO antidumping regulations Vietnam
may rely upon in future antidumping cases.

I. BACKGROUND ON DUMPING

A. Definition of Dumping
The term "dumping" refers to price discrimination in
international business transactions." A classical analysis defined
dumping as "price differentiation in the form of price
discrimination."' 2 One form of dumping occurs when an exporter
sells goods at a lower price in a foreign country than in its domestic
market.' 3 This type of dumping often occurs when the domestic
market and the foreign market are geographically isolated or when
there is a difference in the demand between these two markets.14 A
second form of dumping involves the sale of goods below the cost of
production.' 5 This type of dumping occurs when producers sell goods
at a price below production cost and make profits later, when they
achieve market dominance.' 6
Dumping is different from subsidization. Dumping is an activity
of the private sector, while subsidies are provided by governments.' 7
This difference leads to a distinction between dumping policies and
subsidization policies. An exporting company's government may not
be directly involved in antidumping cases. On the other hand,
measures dealing with subsidies often involve diplomacy.' 8
B. Classificationof Dumping
Generally, dumping can be classified as sporadic dumping,
intermittent dumping, or continuous dumping. Sporadic dumping
occurs when exporters sell an overstock in a foreign market at a price
below the domestic price in order to maintain a domestic price

11.
RICHARD DALE, ANTI-DUMPING LAW IN A LIBERAL TRADE ORDER 1-2 (1980).
12.
RAINER M. BIERWAGEN, GATT ARTICLE VI AND THE PROTECTIONIST BIAS IN
ANTIDUMPING LAWS 8 (1990).
13.
GABRIELLE MARCEAU, ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-TRUST ISSUES IN FREE
TRADE AREAS 11 (2004).
14.
Id.
at 11-12; MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE AND POLICY 398-99 (2d ed. 2006).
15.
MARCEAU, supra note 13, at 13.
16.
MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 14, at 397-98.

17.

John H. Jackson, Dumping in International Trade: Its Meaning and

Context, in ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE 1, 3-4 (John H. Jackson & Edwin A.

Vermulst eds., 1989).
18.

Id.
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structure.1 9 Sporadic dumping often occurs when an exporter sells
perishable goods.2 0
Intermittent dumping occurs "steadily and
systematically for a period of limited duration," 21 and it may be used
when an exporter wants to gain access to a foreign market by setting
prices below production costs. 22 Continuous dumping occurs when
companies produce a large number of items to reach an economy of
scale in order to maintain their domestic price structure.2 3 Their
underlying strategy is to sell their goods in foreign markets at prices
below the domestic price to assure overall profits. 2 4
C. Consequences of Dumping
Dumping may benefit exporters, but it causes misallocation of
resources in the exporter's own country.25 Dumping may injure the
markets of third-party countries as well as those of the importing
market. 26 Dumping in the importing market harms competing
producers and may cause misallocation of resources. 27 Dumping also
can cause the loss of market opportunities for producers in the
importing market.2 8 The potential harm extends to producers of
alternative goods, producers who use dumped products in their own
production process, and manufacturers of components for local
production. 29 If competing producers from third-party countries
export similar products but do not dump, they may suffer injury as
well.
On the other hand, dumping may benefit consumers in the
importing countries because consumers can buy goods at a lower
price.3 0 However, whether the benefit to consumers in the importing
country outweighs, at a macro level, the damages suffered by the
importing country's industries depends on the type of dumping. In
sporadic dumping, the benefit to consumers perhaps outweighs the

19.
Bart S. Fisher, The Anti Dumping Law of the United States: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 5 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 85, 88 (1973).
20.

See id. (describing the relationship between dumping and marginal costs,

and defining sporadic dumping as a product of one's desire to unload overstock to keep
its own country's price structure the same while regarding the good's marginal cost as
zero, thereby increasing the willingness to accept lower prices).
21.

JACOB VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 31 (1923).

22.
Michael Kabik, Dilemma of Dumping front Nonmarket Economy Countries,
6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 339, 348-49 (1992).
23.
Id. at 349.
24.
Fisher, supra note 19, at 87.
25.
Id. at 90.
26.
Kabik, supra note 22, at 349.
27.
Id. at 349-50.
28.
Id. at 350.
29.
Id. at 349-50.
30.
EDWIN VERMULST, THE WTO ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT: A COMMENTARY
2-3 (2005).
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injury suffered by producers in the importing country.3 1
In
intermittent dumping, the damages to importing producers are
potentially greater and more lasting than the benefits to consumers.3 2
In the case of continuous dumping, the effect is controversial. If
related industries in importing countries can adjust themselves,
continuous dumping may provide beneficial competition.3 3 However,
continuous dumping can cause unemployment in importing countries,
and this negative effect may outweigh other benefits. 3 4 Generally,
dumping is favorable to consumers and importers in the importing
country and promotes competition, but dumping can result in
predatory discrimination against local producers.35

II. THE UNITED STATES-VIETNAM BILATERAL
TRADE AGREEMENT (BTA)

A. Overview of the United States-Vietnam Trade
Relationship and the BTA
From the end of the Vietnam War until 1994, there was virtually
no trade between Vietnam and the United States because of the U.S.
embargo of Vietnam.3 6
In July 1993, international financial
organizations, including the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, resumed activities in Vietnam.37 In February 1994, as a
result of the positive attitude of the Clinton Administration, the U.S.
trade embargo was lifted.3 8 However, because of the application of
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Vietnam, the United States did
not grant most favored nation status (MFN status) to Vietnam.3 9
The lack of MFN status was crucial to Vietnam. It created a
trade barrier that impaired the competitiveness of Vietnamese goods
in the U.S. market. 40
In March 1998, in an effort to further

Kabik, supra note 22, at 351.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Fisher, supra note 19, at 91-92.
34.
DALE, supra note 11, at 40.
35.
36.
Christina L. Davis, Do WTO Rules Create a Level Playing Field? Lessons
front the Experience of Peru and Vietnam, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA 219, 238 (John S. Odell ed., 2006).

37.
Chronology ofKey Events in U.S.-Vietnam Relations, supra note 5, at 1.
38.
Id. at 2.
39.
Yen D. Chu, The Making of a Quagmire: The Inadequacies of Applying the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Vietnam's Transitional Economy, 35 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 453, 453-54 (1997).

40.
For example, MFN status enabled the average U.S. tariff rates applied on
Vietnamese export products to decrease from 40 percent to less than 3 percent. MARK
E. MANYIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30416, THE VIETNAM-U.S. BILATERAL TRADE

AGREEMENT 8 (2001), http://www.usvtc.org/info/crs/CRS-BTA-DecO1.pdf.
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normalize trade relations between the two countries, President
Clinton waived the Jackson-Vanik Amendment's application to
Vietnam. This waiver was renewed annually until December 2006,
when the United States formally granted Vietnam permanent normal
trade relations (PNTR), which replaced MFN status in U.S. trade. 4 1
The BTA was signed on July 13, 2000 and entered into force on
December 10, 2001.42 As a result, Vietnam obtained access to the
U.S. market under PNTR, and in exchange, Vietnam agreed to reduce
trade barriers to goods, grant access to U.S. service companies, and
develop domestic laws and regulations to protect intellectual property
rights. 43 The agreement also guaranteed direct investment and
transparency. 44 The BTA was intended to promote the well being of
Vietnam and strengthen U.S. foreign policy. 45
B. The Regulation of Antidumping in the BTA
Antidumping regulations in the BTA were brief. Article 6.4 sets
out the only bilateral antidumping provision:
The Parties acknowledge that the elaboration of the market
disruption safeguard provisions in this Article is without prejudice to
the right of either Party to apply its laws and regulations applicable to
trade in textiles and textile products, and its laws and regulations
applicable to unfair trade, including antidumping and countervailing
46
duty laws.

The

language

of

Article

6.4

lacks

detail

and

substance

on

antidumping.
Instead, it merely assumes that the domestic
antidumping laws of each country will be used where dumping is seen
to occur.
Furthermore, some considered the BTA to be an important
preparatory step in anticipation of Vietnam joining the WTO. 47
Although the BTA's structure is similar to the structure required by
the WTO, the BTA does not include a formal dispute settlement
mechanism. 48 A Joint Committee on Development of Economic and

41.
Id. at 5; see also Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 5003, 112 Stat. 685, 789 (1998) (replacing the term "mostfavored-nation" with "normal trade relations" to reflect a nondiscriminatory policy
towards trading partners).
42.
MANYIN, supra note 40, at 1.
43.
Davis, supra note 36, at 239.
44.
MANYIN, supra note 40, at 13.
45.
Amalia R. Walton, Catfish Wars: Vietnam's Fightfor Free Trade in the U.S.
Court of InternationalTrade, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 471, 478 (2004).

46.
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam on Trade Relations, U.S. Viet., ch. I, art. 6.4, July 13, 2000, 2000
U.S.T. LEXIS 170 [hereinafter BTA].
47.

MANYIN, supra note 40, at 7.

48.

Davis, supra note 36, at 239-40.
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Trade Relations between Vietnam and the United States was created
to monitor implementation of the BTA and resolve problems that
might emerge from the interpretation and implementation of the
BTA. 49

III. DISPUTES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
VIETNAM INVOLVING DUMPING

A. Catfish Case
After the normalization of trade relations between the United
States and Vietnam, Vietnamese producers began to export
significant quantities of catfish to the United States.50
The
Vietnamese catfish industry was highly competitive in the United
States, and within a short time, Vietnam was producing 20 percent of
the frozen catfish fillets sold in the United States.5 1 The Vietnamese
technique of raising catfish in their natural habitat using underwater
fish cages has a comparatively low production cost; the operating cost
of U.S. catfish farms was about two times higher.52 The American
catfish farmers ran an aggressive campaign, stating that the
Vietnamese product was a "slippery catfish wannabe" and floated
"around in Third World rivers nibbling on who knows what."53 A U.S.
congressman asserted that the quality of Vietnamese catfish was not
guaranteed because they "came from a place contaminated by so
much Agent Orange." 54 These comments seemed to have little impact
on sales in the United States.5 5 However, in 2002, the American
catfish farmers successfully lobbied Congress to pass new legislation
that prohibited producers and importers from using the name
"catfish" on their products unless the fish was of the Ictaluridae
family-a family of fish that lives only in North America. 56
On June 28, 2002, after its success in label lobbying, the Catfish
Farmers Association of America initiated an antidumping petition

49.
BTA, supra note 46, ch. VII, art. 5.
Walton, supra note 45, at 479.
50.
51.
Editorial, Harvesting Poverty: The Great Catfish War, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2003, at A18 [hereinafter HarvestingPoverty].
Walton, supra note 45, at 479-81.
52.
53.
HarvestingPoverty, supra note 51.
Id.
54.
55.
Bao Anh Thai, An Analysis of "LessonsLearned" front "Catfish"and "Shrimp"
Anti-Dumping Cases, BAO LAW FIRM 13 (May 2005), http://www.baolawfirm.com.vn/
dmdocuments/an anylysis of lessonslearned from anti dumping case.pdf. The volume of
catfish imported from Vietnam in 2002 was about thirty-six million pounds, higher
than that of 2001 (twenty-six million pounds). Id. Both the value and volume of catfish
imported from Vietnam increased in the period between 2000 and 2002. Id.
56.
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171,
§ 10806, 116 Stat. 134, 526-27 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321d (2006)).
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with the DOC and the ITC against Vietnamese catfish exporters.5 7
American domestic producers frequently use these antidumping
petitions to respond to competition from foreign producers.5 8 Upon
receiving an antidumping petition, the DOC must determine whether
the petitioned product is being dumped, and the ITC must determine
whether the domestic industry has been injured.59
In investigating the complaint, the DOC determined that
Vietnam is a "nonmarket economy,"6 0 defined as an economy where,
inter alia, the government substantially influences the means of
production, the allocation of resources, and the price and output
decisions of companies.6 1 On June 17, 2003, the DOC imposed heavy
antidumping margins on Vietnamese catfish products.6 2 The margins
ranged from 36.84 percent to 52.90 percent for the compulsory
respondents to the antidumping investigation, 44.66 percent for
producers who responded to the investigation questionnaire, and
63.88 percent for all other Vietnamese catfish producers and
exporters.6 3
In the first administrative review, which occurred in 2006, the
DOC imposed a final antidumping margin of 6.81 percent on Vinh
Hoan Company, Ltd. 64 Can Tho Agricultural and Animal Products
Import Export Company (CATACO) withdrew its business
proprietary information from the record. 65 As a result, the DOC
determined that CATACO had not acted to the best of its ability to
comply with a request for information, and CATACO received a
separate rate of 80.88 percent. 66 Other Vietnamese companies that
exported catfish to the United States received the industry-wide rate
of 63.88 percent.6 7
In the second administrative review, which
occurred in 2007, one respondent, QVD Food Company, Ltd. (QVD),

57.
Fact Sheet: Preliminary Determination in the Antidumping Duty
Investigation of Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from Vietnam, DEP'T OF COM.,
http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/FactSheet/0103/catfish-fs_012703.html (last visited Oct.
13, 2010) [hereinafter PreliminaryFact Sheet].
58.
Kerrilee E. Kobbeman, Hook, Line and Siuker: How Congress Swallowed
the Domestic Catfish Industry's Narrow Definition of this Ubiquitous Bottomfeeder, 57
ARK. L. REV. 407, 427-28 (2004).
Walton, supra note 45, at 485.
59.
PreliminaryFact Sheet, supra note 57.
60.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(B)(iv)-(v) (2006).
61.
62.
Fact Sheet: Final Determination in the Antidumping Duty Investigation of
Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from Vietnam, DEP'T OF COM., http://www.ita.doc.gov/
media/FactSheet/0603/catfish final 061703.html
(last visited
Oct. 13,
2010)
[hereinafter Final Fact Sheet].
Id.
63.
64.
Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 71 Fed.
Reg. 14,170, 14,172 (Dep't of Commerce Mar. 13, 2006).
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
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was assigned an antidumping rate of 21.23 percent.68 The rate for
CATACO and Vietnam-wide entities remained unchanged.6 9 In the
third administrative review, which occurred in 2008, QVD and East
Sea Seafoods Joint Venture Co., Ltd. received an antidumping margin
of zero. 70
The rates for CATACO and Vietnam-wide entities
remained unchanged.7 1 Finally, in the fourth administrative review,
which occurred in 2009, QVD, Agifish, and Anvifish were assigned a
separate rate of 0.52 percent.7 2 The industry-wide rate remained at
63.88 percent.7 3
On September 4, 2009, the DOC issued a Notice of Preliminary
Results of New Shipper Reviews and Fifth Antidumping Duty
Administrative Review. 74 New shippers are companies that sold
catfish in the United States during the period of review but were not
investigated and consequently were not assessed antidumping duties
in the original antidumping decision of the DOC.7 5
The fifth
administrative review reduced the antidumping margins applied to
QVD and Vinh Hoan to zero. 76 The review also determined that two
new shippers, Samefico and Cadovimex, had not dumped their catfish
in the United States. 7 7 Agifish and East Sea were assigned a rate of
0.02 percent.78 The antidumping rate of Vietnam-wide entities for
the fifth review period was preliminarily determined to be 2.11
percent, a significant reduction.7 9 Although still subject to a final
decision, this low rate is explicable. Among the twenty exporters and
two new shippers under review, six exporters have been assigned
separate rates.8 0 The petitioning American catfish companies and
organizations 8 ' withdrew requests for review of thirteen exporters,

68.
Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 72 Fed.
Reg. 13,242, 13,245 (Dep't of Commerce Mar. 12, 2007).
Id.
69.
70.
Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 73 Fed.
Reg. 47,885, 47,887 (Dep't of Commerce Aug. 11, 2008) (notice of amended results third
admin. review).
71.
Id.
72.
Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 74 Fed.
Reg. 17,816, 17,817 (Dep't of Commerce Apr. 9, 2009).
Id.
73.
74.
Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 74 Fed.
Reg. 45,805 (Dep't of Commerce Sept. 4, 2009).
75.
See generally id. (summarizing the case history of the new shipper reviews).
76.
Id. at 45,810.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
81.
Id. at 45,805 n.2 ("The Catfish Farmers of America and individual U.S.
catfish processors, America's Catch, Consolidated Catfish Companies, LLC dba
Country Select Catfish, Delta Pride Catfish, Inc., Harvest Select Catfish, Inc.,
Heartland Catfish Company, Pride of the Pond, Simmons Farm Raised Catfish, Inc.,
and Southern Pride Catfish Company LLC ('Petitioners').").
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and the administrative reviews of these thirteen exporters were
cancelled.82 On March 17, 2010, the DOC issued the Final Results of
the Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and New Shipper
Reviews, which contained margin calculations substantially similar
to those contained in the preliminary results issued on September 4,
2009.83
Both the labeling requirement and the DOC's original
decision were widely criticized, even within the United States. Many
assert that the decision protects only a specific interest group and
overlooks benefits to American consumers. 84
Furthermore, the
decision, which arrived soon after the BTA came into effect, impaired
the general feeling of good faith that existed in Vietnam towards the
United States. In the words of Senator John McCain:
In fact, of the 2,500 species of catfish on Earth, this amendment
allows the FDA to process only a certain type raised in North
America-specifically, those that grow in six Southern States. The
program's effect is to restrict all catfish imports into our country by
requiring they be labeled as something other than catfish, an
underhanded way for catfish producers to shut out the competition.
With a clever trick of Latin phraseology and without even a ceremonial
nod to the vast body of trade laws and practices we rigorously observe,
this damaging amendment . . . literally bans Federal officials from
processing any and all catfish imports label[ed] as they arecatfish.... It patently violates our solemn trade agreement with
Vietnam, the very same trade agreement the Senate ratified by a vote
of 88 to 12 only 2 months ago. The ink was not dry on that
agreement when the catfish lobby and its congressional allies slipped
85

the catfish amendment into a must-pass appropriations bill.

The president of the American Seafood Distributors Association also
pointed out the protectionism issue:
Changing the name of Vietnamese catfish to basa should have been
sufficient grounds to protect the market name of the domestic catfish
producers and thus give them the product differentiation that should
have ruled out the need to pile on with a dumping suit as well. The fact
that we are here today to perform the alchemy of turning basa back
into catfish strikes me and the organization that I lead as nothing short

82.
Id. at 45,806 & n.4.
83.
Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 75 Fed.
Reg. 12,726, 12,728 (Dep't of Commerce Mar. 17, 2010).
84.
See Sungjoon Cho, A Dual Catastropheof Protectionism, 25 Nw. J. INT'L. &
BtS. 315, 317 (2005) (describing the contention that the ability of special interest
groups to mobilize the federal government to act in their own interest, against the
benefit to national consumers and industries, as an example of U.S. constitutional
failure).
85.
147 CONG. REC. S13426-27 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2001) (statement of Sen.
McCain).
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of a convoluted action to serve only one master. It's protectionism, pure
86
and simple.

B. Shrimp Case
Due to cheap labor and progress in shrimp rearing technology
(Vietnamese farmers raise shrimp in ponds, while American farmers
largely catch shrimp in the sea), Vietnamese shrimp is cheaper than
American shrimp; some say that Vietnamese shrimp is also more
uniform and better in quality.8 7 From 2000 to 2002, the growth in
demand for shrimp in the United States led to a large increase in
shrimp imports: in 2002, Americans consumed 1,046 million pounds
of shrimp, of which 908 million pounds were imported.8 8 Shrimp
prices in the United States decreased significantly, which led to a fall
in the incomes of domestic shrimp producers.8 9 American shrimp
producers, represented by the Shrimp Trade Action Committee,
struggled to protect their profits.90 In December 2003, the Shrimp
Trade Action Committee brought a DOC dumping action against
Vietnam and five other countries."
The scope of the antidumping
investigation included "certain warm water shrimp and prawns,
whether frozen, wild-caught (ocean harvested) or farm-raised
(produced by aquaculture), head-on or head-off, shell-on or peeled,
tail-on or tail-off, deveined or not-deveined, cooked or raw, or
otherwise processed in frozen form."9 2 In the final determination of
the DOC, the dumping margins levied on Vietnamese shrimp
producers and exporters ranged from 4.13 percent to 25.76 percent.98
In the first administrative review, which occurred in 2007, only
two Vietnamese companies, Grobest & I-Mei Industrial (Vietnam)

86.
Certain Frozen Fish Fillets front Vietnam: Hearing Before the U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n, Inv. No. 731-TA-1012, 147 (2003) (statement of Wally Stevens,
president of the American Seafood Distributors Association).
87.
See Cho, supra note 84, at 327 (focusing on the differences between the
American and Vietnamese catfish and shrimp, both in production and final product).
88.
Certain Frozen or Canned Warmwater Shrimp and Prawns from Brazil,
China, Equador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam, USITC Pub. 3748, Inv. No. 731-TA
1063-1068, IV 5 (Jan. 2005).
89.
See Stephanie Showalter, The United States and Rising Shrimp Imports
front Asia and CentralAmerica: An Economic or Enivironmental Issue?, 29 VT. L. REV.
847, 847 (2005) (citing the statistics related to the decrease in shrimp prices in the
United States).
90.
See id. at 847-48 (noting the Shrimp Trade Action Committee's petitioning
of the ITC).
91.
Id. at 848-49.
92.
Fact Sheet: Amended Final Determinations and Issuance of Antidumping
Orders: Imports of Certain Frozen Wlarmtater Shrimp from Brazil, Ecuador, India,
Thailand, the People's Republic of China, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, DEP'T
OF COM., http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/FactSheet/O105/shrimp_012605.html
(last
visited Oct. 13, 2010).
Id.
93.
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Co., Ltd., and Vietnam Fish One Co., Ltd., sent comments on the
preliminary results of the first administrative and new shipper
review. 94 As a result of the first administrative review, these two
companies received a final dumping margin of zero. 95 Following the
review, the dumping margins applied to other Vietnamese exporters
remained the same as those fixed in the final determination of the
DOC in the initial investigation.9 6
In the second administrative review, which occurred in 2008,
many Vietnamese exporters submitted review requests. 9 7 However,
because the DOC did not have the resources to examine all of them,
only two exporters (Minh Phu and Camimex) were selected as
mandatory respondents. 8
The twenty-six export companies that
timely responded to requests made by the DOC were considered to be
cooperative separate-rate respondents. 9 In the final results of the
second administrative review, the two mandatory respondents,
Camimex and Minh Phu, were assigned final dumping margins of
zero and 0.01 percent respectively.1 00
Most of the cooperative
separate-rate respondents received final dumping margins of 4.57
percent. 0 1 The industry-wide rate for other export companies was
25.76 percent.1 0 2 The third administrative review, which took place
in 2009, resembled the second administrative review.
The
antidumping margin for cooperative separate-rate respondents was
4.57 percent and the industry-wide rate was 25.76 percent.1 08 On
March 15, 2010, the DOC issued the Preliminary Results, Partial
Rescission, and Request for Revocation, in Part, of the Fourth
Administrative Review.1 04 According to these preliminary results, a
separate rate of 3.27 percent was applied to Minh Phu Group, and the
antidumping margin applied to Nha Trang Seafoods was 2.50
percent.1 05 Other separate-rate respondents received antidumping
margins of 2.89 percent.1 06
The industry-wide rate remained

94.
Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
72 Fed. Reg. 52,052, 52,053 (Dep't of Commerce Sept. 12, 2007).
Id. at 52,054.
95.
Id.
96.
97.
Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
73 Fed. Reg. 52,273, 52,274 (Dep't of Commerce Sept. 9, 2008) (final results and partial
rescission).
Id.
98.
Id.
99.
100.
Id. at 52,275.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
74 Fed. Reg. 53,701, 53,702 (Dep't of Commerce Oct. 20, 2009) (amended final results).
104.
Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
75 Fed. Reg. 12,206 (Dep't of Commerce Mar. 15, 2010).
105.
Id. at 12,215.
106.
Id.
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unchanged.1 07 The government of Vietnam alleged that relevant U.S.
laws and decisions of the DOC in the shrimp case were inconsistent
with WTO regulations, especially the Agreement on Implementation
of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(Antidumping Agreement). 108 On April 7, 2010, Vietnam requested
the establishment of a WTO dispute settlement panel.1 09

IV.

CHALLENGES TO VIETNAMESE EXPORTERS IN ANTIDUMPING CASES

A. Reasons Peculiar to Vietnamese Exporters and Producers
In recent years, and due to the doi moi (opening and
reformation) policy, Vietnam has achieved success. Vietnam's work
force is better trained, the production of Vietnamese industry is more
streamlined, and Vietnamese companies have more experience in
marketing their products.11 0 Vietnamese exports such as rice, coffee,
shrimp, and garments have established a firm position in foreign
markets.1 1'
However, one reason why Vietnamese products face
heavy antidumping margins is that Vietnamese exporters possess
limited knowledge and experience in dealing with antidumping laws.
Vietnamese exporters have shown ignorance in antidumping cases.
First, Vietnamese exporters have not been active in researching and
gathering information in antidumping investigations." 2 Second,
when the antidumping cases arose, many companies relied heavily on
the government and the Vietnamese Ministry of Commerce (now the
Ministry of Industry and Trade) because they considered the issue to
be a diplomatic matter rather than an economic matter.1 13 Many
were and are unaware of how to prevent, mitigate, or respond to
antidumping investigations.11 4 Third, Vietnamese companies have
not cooperated with each other and with professional associations to
strengthen their ability to deal effectively with antidumping petitions
from foreign companies.115 Fourth, many Vietnamese exporters do

107.
Id.
108.
Request for Establishment of a Panel by Viet Nam, United States Antidumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from Vietnam, WT/DS404/5 (Apr. 9, 2010).
109.
Id.
110.
See generally BRIAN VAN ARKADIE & RAYMOND MALLON, VIETNAM: A
TRANSITION TIGER? (2003) (providing an overview of doi rnoi and its economic success).
111.
Id. at 181-86.
112.
CUC QUAN LY CANH TRANH-Bo THUONG MAI VIET NAM [DEPARTMENT OF
COMPETITION MANAGEMENT
VIETNAMESE MINISTRY OF TRADE], CHU DONG UNG PHO
VOl CAC VU KIEN CHONG BAN PHA GIA TRONG THUONG MAI QUOC TE [ACTIVELY DEALING
WITH ANTIDUMPING PROCEEDINGS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE] 146 (2006) [hereinafter
VIETNAMESE MINISTRY OF TRADE].

113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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not understand the importance of the onshore investigation and fail
to take advantage of it.1n 6
Moreover, the accounting systems of many Vietnamese exporters
are inadequate and insufficient. Few Vietnamese companies have
either audited reports or an efficient accounting system that meets
even the Vietnamese accounting requirements, and few of these
audited reports meet international accounting standards.1 1 7
Antidumping authorities in importing countries allege that the
accounting systems of Vietnamese exporters are unclear and
inadequate; consequently, the authorities do not accept evidence
provided by Vietnamese exporters and instead use other available
information, which may be unfavorable to the Vietnamese
companies.1 18
In addition, the amount of time allowed for antidumping
investigations is very short.119 This restriction is intended to ensure
that investigating authorities do not prolong antidumping cases and
request unnecessary and complicated information that may impair
international trade activities.1 20
However, this time restriction
substantially disadvantages exporters from developing economies.
Exporting companies must provide very complicated information in a
short time and in unfamiliar formats.1 2 '
In fact, Vietnamese
exporters often request extra time to complete questionnaires and
return answers to antidumping authorities, and these requests
frequently occur within the last days of the extra time allotted. 2 2
Failure to answer the questionnaires and provide data in time results
in the rejection of evidence, and exporters lose the chance to protect
themselves from tariffs.' 23
The catfish case was Vietnam's first antidumping case in the
United States.124 Catfish exporters had to gain knowledge about U.S.
antidumping laws quickly and had to prepare to deal with technical
issues during the antidumping investigations. 2 5
In fact, the
Vietnamese Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers asked
the DOC to extend the due date for nearly all exporters.1 2 6 In the
end, the DOC concluded that only eleven Vietnamese catfish
companies provided sufficient data for the investigation, and it

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 152.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 148-49.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 150-51.
Thai, supra note 55, at 15.
Id.
Id. at 15-16.
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determined separate dumping margins for only those companies.12 7
Other companies were regarded as having failed to meet the
requirements of the antidumping investigation and had to bear the
more burdensome Vietnam-wide rates. 128
Vietnamese exporters still struggle to answer antidumping
questionnaires and to keep proper records that can be used as
evidence in antidumping investigations.' 29
For example, many
Vietnamese exporters negotiated contracts with foreign partners by email and deleted the e-mails after the contracts were completed. 3 0
As a result, these companies could not provide suitable evidence that
they had independently negotiated international sale contracts
without assistance from the Vietnamese government. 13' In many
cases, information was not kept in the required manner.
For
example, antidumping questionnaires often require hourly wages of
employees, but employees may be paid by the piece and not by the
hour.' 32 Many Vietnamese exporters found it difficult to understand
the questionnaires because they are complicated and in English,
require large amounts of detail, and discuss technical issues. 33
These limitations will reemerge if other antidumping cases are filed.
B. Policy Differences for "NonmarketEconomies"
U.S. antidumping laws distinguish countries with a market
economy (MEs) from countries with a nonmarket economy (NMEs).
Under U.S. antidumping laws, an NME is a "foreign country that the
administering authority determines does not operate on market
principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in
such country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise."134 To
determine whether a country operates as an NME, antidumping
authorities must consider:
(i) the extent to which the currency of the foreign country is convertible
into the currency of other countries;
(ii) the extent to which wage rates in the foreign country are
determined by free bargaining between labor and management;
(iii) the extent to which joint ventures or other investments by firms of
other foreign countries are permitted in the foreign country;
(iv) the extent of government ownership or control of the means of
production;

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 16.
FinalFact Sheet, supra note 62.
VIETNAMESE MINISTRY OF TRADE, supra note 112, at 151.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 151.
19 U.S.C § 1677(18)(A) (2006).

2010/1

CATT1iH, SHRIMP, AND THE WTO

121

(v) the extent of government control over the allocation of resources and
over the price and output decisions of enterprises;
(vi) and such other factors as the administering authority considers
135
appropriate.

These factors have been criticized.13 6 There is no methodology to
reach a conclusion with respect to each factor, there is no guidance on
the importance of each factor, there are no quantitative criteria, and
the last factor is vague.1 37 Therefore, the factors confer unreasonably
high discretion on antidumping authorities. Based on these factors,
the DOC could determine that a country is or is not an NME by
interpreting the same source data in different ways.138 For example,
consider the DOC's decision that Vietnam is an NME:
The Vietnamese currency, the dong, is not fully convertible, with
significant restrictions on its use, transfer, and exchange rate. Foreign
direct investment is encouraged, but the government still seeks to
direct and control it through regulation. Likewise, although prices
have been liberalized for the most part, the Government Pricing
Committee continues to maintain discretionary control over prices in
sectors that extend beyond those typically viewed as natural
monopolies. Privatization of SOEs and the state-dominated banking
sector has been slow, thereby excluding the private sector from access
to resources and insulating the state sector from competition. Finally,
private land ownership is not allowed and the government is not
13 9
initiating a land privatization program.

U.S. antidumping laws treat MEs and NMEs differently. In a
typical antidumping case applied to an exporter from an ME, the
DOC determines dumping by trying to determine whether a foreign
exporter sells products to the United States at a price that is less
than fair value. 140 The DOC compares the price of the imported
goods to the price of like products in the exporter's home market.14 1
If this comparison cannot be made because there are no sales or offers
for sale of like products in the exporter's domestic market, the DOC
compares the price of the imported goods to the constructed value or
the price of like products sold to a third country. 14 2 If the price of the

135.
Id.
136.
See Joshua Startup, Note, From Catfish to Shrimp: How Vietnam Learned
to Navigate the Waters of "FreeTrade" as a Non-Market Economy, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1963
(2005) (discussing the view that the "such other factors" provision is needlessly vague).
137.
MARK A. GROOMBRIDGE & CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, TIGER BY THE TAIL: CHINA
AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 49 (1999).

138.
See Sanghan Wang, U.S. Trade Laws Concerning Nonmarket Economies
Revisited for Fairnessand Consistency, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 593, 637 (1996) (noting
that the vagueness of the statute leads to inconsistent determinations).
139.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. Doc. No. A 552-801, ANTIDUMPING DUTY
INVESTIGATION OF CERTAIN FROZEN FISH FILLETS FROM THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM-DETERMINATION OF MARKET ECONOMY STATUS 2 (2002).

140.
141.
142.

19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (2006).
Id. § 1677b(a)(1).
Id.
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goods imported into the United States is lower than the compared
price, dumping has occurred, and if evidence is discovered of material
injury or threat of material injury to a U.S. domestic industry,
antidumping measures will be imposed to offset the difference and to
protect American producers. 143 However, if an exporter's country is
considered to be an NME, U.S. law deems prices and production costs
to be unreliable. 144
Depending on the adequacy of available
information, the DOC can determine the normal value of the
investigated product based on the price of a like product in the
importing country,145 or the DOC can determine the constructed
value. 146 The DOC may also substitute the prices of an ME at the
same perceived level of development as the NME.1 47 This is usually
called the "surrogate country approach."148 The use of different
methods for MEs and NMEs is widely criticized. First, in reality,
there are no pure market economies. 149 Second, it is unfair to
differentiate between market economies and nonmarket economies
for the purpose of antidumping regulations: a slight difference
between the methods used to calculate dumping margins can prevent
NME exporters from exporting to the United States because of high
dumping duties. 50 Third, the regulations that relate to NMEs are
vague,11 which gives antidumping authorities wide discretion. The
determination of whether a country is an ME or an NME largely
depends on interpretations made by the DOC.1 52
Fourth, the determination of a surrogate country is complicated
and almost never exact because MEs and NMEs are inherently
different from each other. Although the notion of a surrogate country

143.
Charlene Barshefsky, Non-Market Economies in Transition and the US
Antidumping Law: Remarks on the Need for Reevaluation, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 373, 374

(1990).
144.
Startup, supra note 136, at 1972.
145.
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1).
146.
Id. § 1677b(c)(1).
147.
Barshefsky, supra note 143, at 374-75.
148.
Kabik, supra note 22, at 361-63.
149.
See William Alford, When Is China Paraguay? An Examination of the
Application of the Antidurnping and Countervailing Duty Laus of the United States to
China and Other 'Nonnarket Economy' Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 132 (1987)
("[E]conomic principles, whether those of nations classified as having market or
nonmarket economies, are not unassailable and immutable rules of science that dictate
particular actions, but human constructs that can be manipulated.").
150.

VIETNAMESE MINISTRY OF TRADE, supra note 112, at 123.

151.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A) (defining an NME as "any foreign country that
the administering authority determines does not operate on market principles of cost or
pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair
value of the merchandise"); Startup, supra note 136, at 1971 ("Critics argue that, while
the current version of the statute offers more guidance on the definition of an NME, it
still grants the government 'wide discretion ... to determine what is [an NME] and
what surrogates can be used' to determine a fair value price.").
152.

VIETNAMESE MINISTRY OF TRADE, supra note 112, at 125-26.
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sounds plausible, the surrogate countries and the exporting countries,
in fact and in practice, are often not truly comparable. 5 3 Therefore,
it is impossible to determine an accurate price substitute for the
purpose of antidumping investigations. 154
Fifth, the surrogate country approach is totally unpredictable.
For a producer, the price-setting method is both unknown and
unforeseeable: there is no benchmark for NME producers to calculate
export prices to avoid dumping.' 5 5 Moreover, the producers of like
products in a surrogate country often compete with producers and
exporters in the exporting country.' 56
Therefore, producers or
exporters in a surrogate country are often unwilling to provide
relevant data for antidumping investigations, or they may provide
skewed information that disadvantages the exporter from the
NME.' 5 7 The Vietnamese catfish case, whose scenario seems to
repeat in the shrimp case,15 8 provides evidence in support of the
conclusion that the use of a surrogate country is flawed. In the
catfish case, some accused the DOC of abusing its discretion in the
way it used the surrogate method to apply a high dumping margin to
Vietnamese exporters. 15 9 The DOC concluded that the data available
to determine product prices and production costs in Vietnam was
likely to be unreliable. 6 0 As a result, the DOC used data from
Bangladesh to attempt to fix a normal value for Vietnamese products
because Bangladesh supposedly has a level of economic development
similar to that of Vietnam.' 6 1
However, the DOC's computation of a surrogate value contained
many shortcomings. First, unlike their counterparts in Vietnam, two
Bangladesh shrimp companies used by the DOC did not raise their
own shrimp.' 6 2 Second, the DOC's data was comprised entirely of
63
information that the Bangladeshi companies provided voluntarily.'
Because much of the information necessary for the investigation was
not available from Bangladesh companies, the DOC also used data
from Indian companies.1 64

153.

Kabik, supra note 22, at 365 n.90.

VIETNAMESE MINISTRY OF TRADE, supra note 112, at 127.
155.
Id. at 366.
156.
Id. at 155.
157.
Id. at 127.
158.
Startup, supra note 136, at 1983.
159.
See, e.g., id. at 1978-79 (claiming that the process "effectively 'neuters' the
NME's comparative advantage" (quoting Wang, supra note 138, at 621)).
160.
Cho, supra note 84, at 331.
161.
Startup, supra note 136, at 1977.
162.
Cho, supra note 84, at 331.
163.
See Startup, supra note 136, at 1973 & n.67 (citing Alford, supra note 149,
at 94) (noting that the surrogate selection process requires the DOC to rely on the
cooperation of foreign companies, often competitors of parties to the case).
164.
Cho, supra note 84, at 331-32.
154.
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C. The ProtectionistCharacteristicof U.S. Policy
In theory, the purpose of an antidumping law is to protect
domestic companies from unfair competition by foreign exporters.
However, U.S. antidumping law appears to be driven by domestic
special interest groups. These special interest groups are often
protected from competition while the DOC ignores the benefits that
both American consumers and other American companies receive
from foreign imports.16 5
In the catfish and shrimp cases, the Legislative and Executive
Branches were both called upon to protect the benefits of American
catfish and shrimp farmers.' 6 6
In terms of legislative power,
antidumping laws seem reasonable when used against predatory or
systematic dumping.
However, if foreign exporters are small
businesses, antidumping measures are a means of protectionism' 6 7
and undermine the accepted economic rule of comparative
advantage.168

In terms of executive power, the way the ITC dealt with the
catfish case is inconsistent with the labeling policy that Congress
previously adopted. Under the pressure of American catfish interest
groups and with inadequate
scientific evidence, Congress
promulgated new legislation to prevent Vietnamese exporters from
labeling their product as "catfish."169
For labeling purposes,
Vietnamese catfish were considered different from catfish raised in
the United States and had to be labeled with a Vietnamese name, tra
or basa.170 Subsequently, the ITC ignored this distinction (previously
considered crucial to American producers) and considered Vietnamese
catfish a "like product" to American catfish.171

165.
N. Gregory Mankiw & Phillip L. Swagel, Antidumping: The Third Rail of
Trade Policy, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 107, 107 (2005).
166.
Cho, supra note 84, at 317.
167.
See id. at 325 (arguing that protectionism is the only explanation for
invoking antidumping laws against small businesses as these exporters cannot
implement international predatory pricing).
168.
Id. at 326.
169.
See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171,
§ 10806, 116 Stat. 134, 526-27 (2002) (limiting the use of the term "catfish" to fish
within the Ictaluridae family); Startup, supra note 136, at 1974 (noting that Congress
promulgated this legislation "despite the fact that the Food and Drug Administration,
which has jurisdiction over food labeling, found no basis for this distinction").
170.
Startup, supra note 136, at 1974.
171.
Kara L. Petteway, Free Trade us. Protectionism: The Case of Catfish in
Context, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 473, 477 (2004).
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D. The Lack of an InternationalMechanism to
Resolve Dumping Cases
The decisions of the U.S. antidumping authorities in the catfish
and shrimp cases, which adversely affected Vietnamese producers
and exporters, 172 were conclusive. At that time, Vietnam was not a
member of the WTO; therefore, Vietnamese producers could not
require the Vietnamese government to resort to the WTO dispute
resolution mechanism to challenge the U.S. antidumping decisions.17 3

V. WTO

REGULATIONS ON ANTIDUMPING

Governments use antidumping laws to protect domestic
industries from imported foreign goods.1 74
Antidumping is a
frequently used remedy. 7 5 As a result of member commitments to
the WTO, normal import tariffs have gradually been lifted and
provide a less effective means to protect domestic goods.176
Antidumping remedies provide an alternative method of protecting
domestic producers. Antidumping is more sophisticated but no less
effective than tariffs, as shown by the sizeable impact of antidumping
laws on Vietnamese aquaculture producers. Domestic antidumping
remedies may injure foreign exporters and become barriers to trade.
The WTO has provisions that regulate members' antidumping
remedies and balance the benefits between domestic and foreign
producers.
These provisions include Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) and the
Antidumping Agreement.' 7 7 WTO regulations permit certain types of
antidumping actions, but antidumping duties may be used only if

172.
173.

See supra Part III.
Walton, supra note 45, at 472.

174.
MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 14, at 401.
175.
JAMES P. DURLING & MATTHEW R. NICELY, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO
ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT: NEGOTIATING HISTORY AND SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATION
2 (2002); MICHAEL J. TREBICOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 252 (3d ed. 2005).

176.
For example, as part of its WTO commitments, Vietnam has to implement
import tariff reduction within five to seven years of its accession into the WTO. Report
of the Working Party on the Accessions of Vietnam, Schedule CLX-Viet Nam: Part 1Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods, WT/ACC/VNM/48/Add.1 (Oct. 27,
2006); Runckel & Associates, What Impact Vietnam's New 14TO Membership 14ill Have
and What Vietnam Has Committed, BUSINESS-IN-ASIA.COM, http://www.business-inasia.com/wto vietnam impacts.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
177.
GATT 1994 art. VI; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S 201
[hereinafter Antidumping Agreement].
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dumping actions have already caused or threatened to cause material
injury to a domestic industry. 7 8 In addition, antidumping duties
must not exceed the dumping margin, which is normally determined
by the difference between the prices of goods in the exporting country
and the prices of goods in the importing country. 7 9
A. Determinationof Whether Dumping Has Occurred
Dumping occurs when "products of one country are introduced
into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of
the products." 8 0 Article 2 of the Antidumping Agreement provides
that:
[A] product is to be considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced into the
commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the export
price of the product exported from one country to another is less than
the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like
18
product when destined for consumption in the exporting country. '

The normal value and the export price must be compared fairly,' 8 2
which means that the comparison must be made "at the same level of
trade" and, if possible, with regard to transactions made at nearly the
same time.1 83 If there is evidence that the export price does not
reflect the market price of the product because the exporter and the
importer are dependent on one another, the export price may be
determined based on the price at which the product is first resold to
an independent party. 184
To determine the normal value, sales transactions are required
to meet four conditions. 85 First, the sale must be made in the
"ordinary course of trade." 8 6 The Antidumping Agreement does not
define "ordinary course of trade"; however, the Appellate Body ruled
that "[g]enerally, sales are in the ordinary course of trade if made
under conditions and practices that, for a reasonable period of time
prior to the date of sale of the subject merchandise, have been normal

178.
MATERIALS
179.
180.

MICHAEL PRYLES ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW COMMENTARY AND
969 (2d ed. 2004).
Id.
GATT 1994 art. VIA.

181.
182.

Antidumping Agreement art. 2.1.
Panel Report, Egypt-Definitive Antidumping Measures on Steel Rebar

from Turkey,

183.

1 7.335,

WT/DS221/R (Aug. 8, 2002).

Antidumping Agreement art. 2.4; MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 14, at

407.

184.
Antidumping Agreement art. 2.3.
185.
See id. art. 2.1 (determining if there have been sales below the normal
value in the importing country by comparing sales (1) in the ordinary course of trade
(2) of a like product (3) "destined for consumption in the exporting country" (4) to a
comparable price in the importing country).
186.
Id.

2010/1

CATT1iH, SHRIMP, AND THE WTO

12 7

for sales of the foreign like product." 8 7 If the product is sold in the
exporting country at a price below the production cost, that price
cannot be used to determine the dumping margin if antidumping
authorities determine that "such sales are made within an extended
period of time in substantial quantities and are at prices which do not
provide for the recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of
time." 188 Second, goods produced in the importing country and goods
produced in the exporting countries must be like products. 89 The
Antidumping Agreement provides that:
Throughout this Agreement the term "like product" ("produit
similaire") shall be interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e.
alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the
absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in
all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product
90
under consideration.1

The definition of a "like product" has not been discussed in any
antidumping case; however, in other WTO contexts, the Appellate
Body holds that there are no general rules to determine whether two
products are alike, and this issue must be decided on a case-by-case
basis. 19 '
Third, the goods must be "destined for consumption in the
exporting country."192 Fourth, the price must be comparable. 93 The
dumping margins must be determined, first, from the difference
between the export price and the price of the like product sold in the
exporting country.194 If like products are not sold in the exporting
country, the dumping margins may be determined based on the
difference between the prices of the product in the market to which it
is exported and the price of the same or like products exported to an
appropriate third country.19 5 Alternatively, the dumping margin may
be determined by comparison to a price constructed from the cost of
production in the exporting country "plus a reasonable amount to
cover administrative costs, selling costs, general costs," and profits.' 9 6

187.
Appellate Body Report, United States Anti-dumping Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan,
139, WT/DS184/AB/R (July 24, 2001)
(emphasis omitted).
188.
See Antidumping Agreement art. 2.2.1 (noting that such sales may be
treated as "not being in the ordinary course of trade" and the price "may be disregarded
in determining normal value").
189.
Id. art. 2.1.
190.
Id. art. 2.6.
191.
MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 14, at 408.
192.
Antidumping Agreement art. 2.1.
193.
See id. ("[A] product is to be considered as being dumped ... if the export
price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable
price . . . when destined for consumption in the exporting country.").
194.
Id.
195.
Id. art. 2.2.
196.
Id.
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This constructed value is calculated from information provided by
"the exporter or producer under investigation."19 7 If the antidumping
authorities cannot determine the constructed value on that basis, the
amounts may be determined from:
(i) the actual amounts incurred and realized by the exporter or
producer [under investigation] in respect of production and sales in the
domestic market of the country of origin of the same general category of
products;
(ii) the weighted average of the actual amounts incurred and realized
by other exporters or producers subject to investigation in respect of
production and sales of the like product in the domestic market of the
country of origin;
(iii) any other reasonable method, provided that the amount for profit
so established shall not exceed the profit normally realized by other
exporters or producers on sales of products [of any] of the same general
198
category in the domestic market of the country of origin.

The weighted average must be determined from data obtained
from more than one exporter or producer. 99 The dumping margins
may be determined by comparing the normal value established on a
weighted average basis to the "weighted average of all comparable
export transactions."20 0 The dumping margins may also be fixed by
comparing the normal value to the "export prices on a transaction-totransaction basis."2 0 '
However, antidumping authorities may
disallow use of the weighted average and use the price of individual
export transactions to make a comparison if they have appropriate
evidence of "a pattern of export prices which differ[s] significantly
among different purchasers, regions or time periods."2 02 In addition,
the dumping margins must be determined for the product under
investigation as a whole, rather than for certain types of the
product. 20 3
If the exporting country is a nonmarket economy, Article VI of
the GATT provides that:
It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which has
a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where
all domestic prices are fixed by the State, special difficulties may exist
in determining price comparability . . . and in such cases importing
contracting parties may find it necessary to take into account the

197.
Id. art. 2.2.1.1.
198.
Id. art. 2.2.2(i)-(iii).
199.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, 74, WT/DS141/AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001)
[hereinafter European Communities].
200.
Antidumping Agreement art. 2.4.2.
201.
Id.
202.
Id.
203.
European Communities, supra note 199, 53.
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possibility that a strict comparison with domestic prices in such a
country may not always be appropriate.204

The Antidumping Agreement fails to further explain antidumping
procedure for nonmarket economies.
As a result, domestic
antidumping authorities can freely choose to use the constructed
value method, as stipulated under the Antidumping Agreement, or
another method, such as the surrogate country method.20 5
B. Determination of Injury
A dumping action results in antidumping duties if it "causes or
threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory
of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a
domestic industry."2 06 Although "material injury" is not defined, 207
the standard to prove material injury in antidumping cases is not as
high as the standard to prove serious injury in the Agreement on
Safeguards.2 0 8 A finding of material injury requires evidence of the
volume of the dumped product and its effect on prices in the
importing market for like products, as well as the effect of the
dumped "imports on domestic producers of like products."20 9
When determining the volume of a dumped import, antidumping
authorities must assess whether there is a significant increase
(absolute increase or relative increase in comparison with the
production or consumption in the importing country) in the volume of
the dumped products. 210 With respect to the price, investigating
authorities must determine whether the dumped product undercuts
or depresses the prices of like products in the importing country or
prevents the domestic price from increasing. 21' With regard to the
effect of the dumped products on the industry of the importing
country, the antidumping authorities must evaluate:
all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state
of the industry, including actual and potential decline in sales, profits,
output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or
utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude
of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash

204.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex I, art. VI.1.2, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
205.
JUDITH CZAKO ET AL., WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, A HANDBOOK ON ANTIDUMPING INVESTIGATIONS 35 (2003).

206.
GATT 1994 art. VIA.
207.
MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 14, at 418.
208.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia,
124,
WT/DS177/AB/R (May 1, 2001).
209.
Antidumping Agreement art. 3.1.
210.
Id. art. 3.2.
211.
Id.
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flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or
212
investments.

When determining injury, domestic antidumping authorities
must evaluate all of the factors listed above.21 3 If an antidumping
investigation assesses the activities of more than one exporting
country, the antidumping authorities may evaluate the impact of all
imports from all of the investigated countries, given that certain
specified conditions are met. 214 Moreover, antidumping measures
require a finding, based on all available evidence, that the dumping
activities cause the injury to the domestic industry. 2 15
The
antidumping authorities must also examine the possibility that
factors other than dumped imports cause injury to the domestic
industry, and the injury caused by these other factors must be
separated from the injury caused by the dumped imports.2 1 6
When determining whether there is a threat of material injury,
as opposed to an actual material injury, antidumping authorities
must base their conclusions on comprehensive factual evidence rather
than "allegation, conjecture or remote possibility." 217 The threat
must be foreseeable and imminent.2 18 There are several types of
legitimate factual evidence:
(i) a significant rate of increase of dumped imports into the domestic
market indicating the likelihood of substantially increased importation;
(ii) sufficient freely disposable, or an imminent, substantial increase in,
capacity of the exporter indicating the likelihood of substantially
increased dumped exports to the importing Member's market, taking
into account the availability of other export markets to absorb any
additional exports;

212.
Id. art. 3.4.
213.
Appellate Body Report, Thailand Anti-durnping Duties on Angles, Shapes
and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams front Poland,
128,
WT/DS122/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
214.
Antidumping Agreement art. 3.3.
Where imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously
subject to anti-dumping investigations, the investigating authorities may
cumulatively assess the effects of such imports only if they determine that (a)
the margin of dumping established in relation to the imports from each country
is more than de mininis as defined in paragraph 8 of Article 5 and the volume
of imports from each country is not negligible and (b) a cumulative assessment
of the effects of the imports is appropriate in light of the conditions of
competition between the imported products and the conditions of competition
between the imported products and the like domestic product.
Id.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. art. 3.5.
Id.
Id. art. 3.7.
Id.
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(iii) whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant
depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices, and would likely
increase demand for further imports; and
(iv) inventories of the product being investigated.

219

The antidumping measures in cases involving threat of injury to a
domestic industry must "be considered and decided with special
care." 220
C. Initiationof Investigation
A domestic industry may initiate an antidumping investigation
by a written application.2 2 1 The application must show evidence of
dumping, injury to domestic industry, and causation between the
dumping and injury. 222 It requires evidence of dumping, but it is not
necessary to include analysis of that evidence.22 3 An investigation is
initiated only if the application "has been made by or on behalf of the
domestic industry."224 When conducting the investigation, evidence
of dumping and injury must be considered simultaneously. 225 if
antidumping authorities judge that the evidence of either the
dumping or injury is insufficient, the investigation must be
terminated.2 26
If antidumping authorities have evidence to
"determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis" or that the
quantity of dumped goods or the injury is insignificant, then the
investigation must be terminated immediately. 227 An investigation
must normally be concluded within one year from its initiation and
must not exceed eighteen months.22 8 Antidumping authorities must
notify the interested parties of all essential facts uncovered by the
investigation.22 9 Interested parties in an antidumping investigation
have the right to present evidence in support of their position, 230 and
they are allowed access to information provided by other parties.23 '

219.
Id. art. 3.7(i)-(iv).
220.
Id. art. 3.8.
221.
Id. art. 5.1.
222.
Id. art. 5.2.
223.
Panel Report, Mexico Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, 7.76, WT/DS132/R (Jan. 28, 2000) ("Article 5.2
does not require an application to contain analysis, but rather to contain information,
in the sense of evidence, in support of allegations.").
224.
Antidumping Agreement art. 5.4.
225.
Id. art. 5.7.
226.
Id. art. 5.8.
227.
Id.
228.
Id. art. 5.10.
229.
Id. art. 6.9.
230.
Id. art. 6.1.
231.
Id. art. 6.1.2. However, this right is limited by a confidentiality protection.
Id.
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VI. THE EXTENT TO WHICH VIETNAMESE EXPORTERS
MAY BENEFIT FROM THE REGULATIONS AND RULINGS
OF THE WTO ON ANTIDUMPING

In recent years, the number of WTO challenges to antidumping
measures has grown significantly.2 32 Vietnamese exporters can learn
a number of beneficial lessons from these challenges. First, the WTO
Appellate Body has expressly ruled that the U.S. antidumping
authorities cannot use "zeroing" methodology to determine that
foreign companies are dumping goods in American markets.2 3 3
Zeroing methodology violates Article 2.4 of the Antidumping
Agreement, which requires that antidumping authorities fairly
compare the export price to the normal value. 234 The European
Union has stopped using zeroing methodology. 235 The United States
chose to retain the zeroing method, but if the United States continues
to do so, relations between the United States and its trading partners
will likely be impaired.2 36 The zeroing methodology has been found to
be inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the Antidumping Agreement,
GATT Article VI:2, and Article 11.3 of the Antidumping
Agreement. 23 7
Second, antidumping authorities of WTO member countries may
use only those antidumping measures expressly listed in GATT
Article VI and in the Antidumping Agreement, which measures
include provisional measures, price undertakings, and antidumping
duties.2 38 As a matter of principle, other antidumping measures are

232.
DURLING & NICELY, supra note 175, at 3.
233.
See Appellate Body Report, United States-Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping
Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan,
212(b),
WT/DS244/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2003) (finding use of zeroing inconsistent with the
Antidumping Agreement). Briefly, zeroing permits antidumping authorities to consider
the difference between the normal value and the export price as zero, even if the former
is higher; this practice prevents the overpriced products from offsetting underpriced
products for the purpose of a dumping determination. Mankiw & Swagel, supra note
165, at 10.
234.
Id. 134.
235.
Jeffrey W. Spaulding, Do International Fences Really Make Good
Neighbors? The Zeroing Conflict Between Antidumping Law and International
Obligations, 41 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 379, 431 (2006).
236.
See id. at 433 (noting that although the United States is not obligated to act
on rulings by the WTO prohibiting zeroing, "continuing stubbornness" is a "foreboding
sign" for trade relations).
237.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Existence and
Application of Zeroing Methodology, 198-99, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009).
238.
Panel Report, United States-Anti-dumping Act of 1916: Complaint by the
European Communities,
6.196, WT/DS136/R (Mar. 31, 2000). Price undertaking
involves either raising prices or decreasing exports to remedy the dumping issue. WonMog Choi & Henry S. Gao, ProceduralIssues in Anti-Dumping Regulations of China: A
Critical Review Under the WTO Rules, 5 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 663, 673 (2006).
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prohibited.2 39
Third, the imposition of an enhanced bond
requirement, with respect to antidumping duties against shrimp
products of a foreign exporter during an administrative review period,
has been determined by the Appellate Body of the WTO to be
"unreasonable." An enhanced bond requirement is not allowed under
the Ad Note to Article VI: 2 and VI:3 of the GATT unless: (i) there is a
"'likelihood' of an increase in the margin of dumping of an exporter as
a result of which there will be a significant additional liability to be
secured," and (ii) there is a "'likelihood of default' on the part of
importers in respect of whom such additional liability is likely to
arise." 240 Vietnam can challenge an enhanced bond requirement if it
can demonstrate that neither condition exists.
Fourth, WTO
regulations on antidumping have been created to give special regard
to developing countries:
It is recognized that special regard must be given by developed
country Members to the special situation of developing country
Members when considering the application of anti-dumping measures
under this Agreement. Possibilities of constructive remedies provided
for by this Agreement shall be explored before applying anti-dumping
duties where they would affect the essential interests of developing
24 1
country Members.

Vietnam may be able to invoke this WTO policy in its
negotiations with developed countries to reduce the period during
which it is considered to be a nonmarket economy.
Fifth, and
perhaps most importantly, developing countries such as Vietnam may
take advantage of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism when a
developed country is guilty of discriminatory treatment of imported
goods. As one scholar wrote:
First, the option to file a legal complaint allows developing countries to
force a developed country to come to the negotiating table and discuss
their request. Second, the DSU [Dispute Settlement Understanding]
makes international trade law the standard for reaching an agreement.
Third, use of shared legal rules facilitates finding allies with related
interests to support the case. Fourth, the long-term economic interest
in supporting the rules encourages compliance with rulings. Without
the framework provided by the dispute settlement process, a developing
country is likely to encounter refusal to negotiate by powerful countries,
arbitrary standards, limited interest from third countries in their trade
242
problem, and lack of leverage to bargain for concessions.

In short, as a WTO member, Vietnam can use the WTO dispute
resolution mechanism to protect its export companies in foreign

239.
Antidumping Agreement art. 18.1.
240.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Customs Bond Directive for
Merchandise Subject to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties, 258, WT/DS345/AB/R
(July 16, 2008) (emphasis omitted).
241.
Antidumping Agreement art. 15.
242.
Davis, supra note 36, at 223.
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markets against practices and provisions in antidumping laws that
are inconsistent with the GATT or the Antidumping Agreement.

VII. CONCLUSION
As trade relationships with other countries increase, Vietnamese
exporters will probably face more antidumping disputes.
The
Vietnamese catfish and shrimp cases provided the country with
valuable experience. Although there are still many challenges for
Vietnamese exporters in antidumping cases in foreign markets,
Vietnam's WTO membership and its experience in prior disputes will
be valuable if future disputes occur. Vietnamese exporters should be
more capable of defending themselves in future antidumping
disputes, and they will be better informed of their options if
unfavorable antidumping remedies are imposed. The ability of the
Vietnamese government to challenge a foreign antidumping decision
before the WTO is one such valuable option.

